Encarta
Historical Essays reflect the knowledge and insight of leading
historians. This collection of essays is assembled to support the
National Standards for World History. In this essay, Richard Foltz
examines the dynamics and consequences of the rapid expansion of Islam
that began in the 7th century ad.
Internationalization of Islam
By Richard Foltz
Islam
is often thought of as an Arab religion—and for much of the 7th century
it was. The third major Abrahamic faith (with Judaism and Christianity,
religions that trace their origin to the biblical Abraham) arose in
western Arabia. Its prophet, Muhammad, was an Arab; its revealed
scripture, the Koran (Qur’an), is written in Arabic; and by the end of
Muhammad’s life in 632 all the tribes of the Arabian peninsula had
submitted to his authority. Arab-led armies conquered territories from
Spain to India within less than a century, and they established a
central administration, the caliphate, in which Arabs held most of the
positions of power and privilege.
Many Arabs came to view
their astonishing military successes as proof of their new religion’s
superiority. This notion was apparently confirmed by the rewards of new
and unimagined wealth and status throughout the conquered lands. Arabs
acquired vast amounts of booty in battle, and following their victories
they assumed important and lucrative positions within the new imperial
government of the caliphate. Their new empire also gave them control
over trade, a situation highly favorable both to Arab merchants and to
government officials who collected tariffs.
It is not
surprising, then, that the Arabs were loathe to share these vast
benefits with people outside the Muslim community. Nor is it surprising
that outsiders sought to become part of the privileged group. In large
measure, this tension underlay Islam’s dramatic transformation from a
specifically Arab cultural expression into a cosmopolitan, universal
tradition within little more than a hundred years.
Arab Acceptance of other Cultures
Although
many people still believe Islam was a religion spread “by the sword,”
it is important to distinguish the spread of rule by Muslims from the
spread of Islam as a religious belief. The Koran states that “there is
no compulsion in matters of religion,” and the Muslim Arabs, desiring to
preserve their power and the mystery of their success, had little
interest in bringing others into the community. However, the Koran does
enjoin Muslims to spread Islamic rule, so that wherever Muslims live,
they are not forced to live according to laws that might go against
their faith.
From the first major Arab conquests—of the
former Byzantine lands of Egypt and Syria to the west and north, and the
entire Persian Sassanian empire to the east—Muslims generally were
content to leave existing systems and infrastructures intact. As a
traditionally tribal people, the Arabs had no previous experience or
models of their own for ruling a whole empire of non-Arabs. They
sensibly chose to leave things largely in place, while occupying the top
governmental positions and presiding as the ultimate authority in
important decisions. Administrative records were kept in Greek, Aramaic,
or Pahlavi Persian throughout the 7th century and even later in the
east, and coinage only gradually acquired Arabic inscriptions. Taxation
systems remained intact, and local communities within the new Arab
territories were mostly left under the legal jurisdiction of their own
leaders. Centrally appointed Muslim judges, or qadis, ruled only in
major cases. Bureaucrats generally kept their positions under nominal
Arab bosses. In education, Christian, Jewish, and other non-Muslim
teachers continued to teach at the major institutions (such as the
medical school at Gundeshapur in southwestern Iran), often instructing
Muslim Arab students.
In fact, compared with conditions
under the Byzantines and Sassanids, the period of the Arab Umayyad
dynasty (661-751) was one of extraordinary religious and cultural
tolerance for the non-Muslim subject populations. The ruling policies of
the Umayyads were driven less by benevolence than by practical
concerns, however. The Arabs considered Islam their own religion; as
long as they remained firmly in control politically, the traditions of
the so-called protected peoples (conquered residents protected by the
Muslims from other invading armies) posed no threat. Furthermore, the
Arabs were aware of the many ways in which their subjects’ cultural
heritages could benefit them as rulers. The Umayyads allowed and
encouraged the immigration of skilled individuals—such as physicians,
astronomers, and mathematicians—from the Byzantine world. Many of these
immigrants were members of unorthodox Christian sects or were
unconverted pagans who suffered persecution under the Byzantines and
found the Arab-ruled lands more hospitable. The Arabs also were open to
learning from the intellectual traditions of the classical Mediterranean
world, including the works of the Greek and Latin philosophers and
scientists, shunned by the Christian Byzantines. As a result of this
interest, many classical works were translated into Arabic; later these
Arabic translations were transmitted to medieval Europe, mainly through
Spain.
Through the religious self-confidence of the
Umayyads, the Muslim Arabs benefited from the most useful aspects of the
civilizations that preceded them. Their adoption of a vast array of
administrative, technical, and scientific tools enriched their empire
and shaped their own developing Islamic culture.
Consequences of Conversion to Islam
Many
of the Arabs’ subjects sought membership in the community of Muslims
for the very reason that Arabs were protective of their privileged
group. Bureaucrats under Arab rule envisioned an increase in power
through conversion: They imagined that their relationships with their
superiors would improve and that their positions would be more secure if
they adopted a Muslim identity. Businessmen saw advantages in belonging
to an increasingly Muslim-dominated global trade network, in which
Muslims were routinely given favorable terms and concessions.
Intellectuals hoped to win legitimacy for their views and ideas by
presenting them in an Islamic framework. By converting, professional
soldiers could fight in the Islamic army and thereby hope to win booty
and other benefits of the continuously successful Arab campaigns. Some
converts also might have seen an advantage in freedom from the jizyah,
or poll tax, that the protected peoples were required to pay their
Muslim overlords. The Muslims saw this as a protection tax because
non-Muslims were not supposed to serve in the army. However, while some
non-Muslims may have considered this tax discriminatory, during the
first years of the Umayyad caliphate the jizyah was significantly less
than the heavy taxes that had been exacted by the Byzantines and the
Sassanids. Therefore, it probably did not seem particularly onerous to
most of the Caliph’s subjects.
A problem facing those who
wished to join Islamic society was that the society was still organized
according to Arab tribal norms. A major theme of the Koran is the
equality of all believers before God, but in reality hierarchical
divisions among the Arabs had never disappeared. Earlier converts and
their descendants felt entitled to special status, and clans from Mecca
felt rivalry with those from Medina. As certain clans immigrated to new
homes throughout the empire and acquired local power bases, tensions
arose between Arab groups in different geographical regions. Thus, while
the Arabs could define themselves as Muslims in relation to outsiders,
among themselves they remained keenly aware of the clan affiliations
that formed the basis of their identity within their own communities.
By
definition, anyone who was not an Arab had no Arabian clan identity.
Becoming a Muslim was easy enough, the only requirement being the
recitation of the shahada, the profession of faith: “There is no god but
Allah, and Muhammad is his Messenger.” But becoming a member of Arab
society was another matter. For a non-Arab convert the solution was to
seek an Arab patron to serve as a sponsor within a given clan.
The Abbasid Revolution
The
system of sponsorship by which non-Arabs gained admission into the
Muslim community did not guarantee them the full equality laid down in
the Koran. Each client’s place within the Arabs’ clan-based social
structure was ensured only by the Arab patron, upon whom the client
remained dependent. By the late 7th century it seems that many of the
converts were beginning to express dissatisfaction with this state of
affairs and to seek ways to assert their equal rights as Muslims.
The
clients were not the only dissatisfied Muslims, however. Discontent
arose among the various Arab clans over regional inequalities in
political and economic power. Many Arabs felt that the Umayyad caliphs
and their families, who ruled from Damascus (in present-day Syria), were
imitating the corrupt lifestyles of the ousted Byzantine governors. The
Umayyads were accused of drinking, debauchery, nepotism, and other
vices. The conflict between the first Umayyad governor, Muawiyah, and
the fourth caliph, Ali, led indirectly to Ali’s murder in 661. Likewise,
it was Muawiyah’s son Yazid who sent the army that killed Ali’s second
son, Husayn, and his followers at Karbalā’, Iraq, in 680.
The
issue of legitimacy served as a rallying point for Muslims with all
manner of complaints against the Umayyads. For the many opponents of the
Umayyads, a natural alternative was to support the leadership of the
House of the Prophet, or Shi’ites. In Khorāsān—on the eastern Iranian
fringe of the empire farthest from the reach of caliphal
power—widespread opposition to the rule of Damascus, in combination with
popular pro-Ali sentiment within the local military, inspired a revolt
that succeeded in dethroning the Umayyads in 751. The movement was led
by Iranian general Abu Muslim in the name of a descendent of the
Prophet’s uncle Abbas; hence the name of the new dynasty, the Abbasids.
The Growing Influence of Non-Arab Converts
By
the dawn of the 8th century the number of non-Arab converts was
increasing steadily, and with this increase came a corresponding rise in
influence. As Muslims with a recognized place in Islamic society, these
converts could claim access to the divine authority embodied in the
Koran alongside—and sometimes in competition with—their Arab patrons. To
do this they had to learn Arabic, and they became the first Arabic
grammarians. As the converts adopted Arabic as the premier language of
the increasingly ecumenical Islamic culture, they transformed the very
language itself. Those engaged in translation work had an especially
strong influence in shaping the language. Arabic, originally a language
of desert nomads, lacked vocabulary for expressing many abstract
scientific and philosophical concepts. The many new words and
expressions coined by translators converted Arabic into a language of
high civilization, capable of communicating the most complex and
sophisticated ideas.
As more and more non-Arabs came to
identify themselves as members of the Muslim community, tensions arose
over norms of proper lifestyle and behavior. The Koran explicitly
addresses no more than a handful of legal and lifestyle questions.
Although many Muslims believe that, correctly interpreted, the Koran
contains guidance in all matters of life, interpretations often do not
concur. As long as all or most Muslims were Arabs, Arab social custom
prevailed when the Koran did not instruct otherwise. However, non-Arabs
often had different norms, and conflicts arose as the number of non-Arab
Muslims grew. Appeal to the common authority of the Koran did not
always resolve these issues, and Muslims sought a supplemental source of
authority in the example of the prophet Muhammad. The Koran validated
this recourse by stating, “You have a good example in the Messenger of
God.” If one party in a dispute could claim that the Prophet himself had
set a precedent for a given behavior or position, that was seen as
authoritative for Muslims. This could only be known, however, from
anecdotes about the Prophet that had been transmitted orally by those
who had known him in person.
Many critically minded
individuals assumed the task of collecting stories about the Prophet.
They attempted to establish the credibility of these stories by
analyzing the biographies of those who had transmitted them. The result
of this vigorous scholarly activity, which continued into the 9th
century, was an immense body of literature called hadiths. Most Muslims
came to accept hadiths as second only to the Koran in authority. It
appears that the increasing internationalism of Islam was key in
bringing about the compilation of hadith literature, because all six of
the hadith collections recognized as canonical by Sunni Muslims were
compiled in the Iranian world. Some scholars have speculated that it was
the divergence in social norms between Arabs and non-Arab converts that
gave rise to the need for a commonly accepted basis of authority. That
is, as long as all Muslims were Arabs, questions not explicitly
addressed in the divine revelation would be resolved on the basis of
Arab norms; whereas, if the disagreement were between Arabs and
non-Arabs, the established norms of the respective parties would not be
the same, hence the need for a second authority.
The Rise of Iranian Influence
Under
the Abbasids the imperial capital was moved to Mesopotamia, at the
western edge of the Iranian world. From that point on, Iranian influence
on secular and religious life was paramount. The new caliphs chose
Iranians (most notably from the Barmak family, or Barmecides, who
formerly had been Buddhist priests) for most of the important
ministerial positions. Under the influence of their Iranian advisors the
Abbasids adopted the Sassanian imperial system almost entirely,
including court protocol, the system of tax farming (local landlords
collecting imperial taxes), the solar calendar and equinox festivals,
patronage of court literature, and music. They even adopted the
ideologies and symbolism of the pre-Islamic Sassanian emperors; these
ideologies and symbols were based on absolute kingship in which the
ruler was seen as the “shadow of God on Earth.”
The latter
half of the 8th century saw an enormous rise in the prominence of
Iranian factors shaping the development of Islamic civilization. In 762
the caliph Mansur built a new imperial capital between the Tigris and
Euphrates rivers near the former Sassanian capital of Ctesiphon; the new
city was called Baghdād, Persian for “given by God.” Along with the
Barmak family, other Iranians attained high administrative positions
under the Abbasids. Among them was Ibn al-Muqaffa’, who is best known
for translating literary works from Persian into Arabic. Although Arabic
was not his native language, Ibn al-Muqaffa’ viewed these translations
as a means of asserting Iranian cultural superiority.
This
paradox goes to the heart of Iranian identity. Ibn al-Muqaffa’ was a
convert to Islam, and within a few centuries nearly all Iranians would
become Muslims. Yet it was the Arabs—viewed as uncivilized inferiors by
Iranians since ancient times—who had brought Islam to them. Even today,
many Iranians perceive the Arab destruction of the Sassanid empire as
the single greatest tragedy in Iran’s long history. In the 8th century,
Iranian intellectuals such as Ibn al-Muqaffa’ saw Persian translations
into Arabic as a way of establishing Iranian legitimacy and status
throughout the Islamic world. These intellectuals initiated a literary
movement known as the shu’ubiyya, through which works such as the
Thousand and One Nights were translated into Arabic and won their place
in the world of Islamic literature. The shu’ubiyya movement symbolized
the many means by which Iranians and other non-Arabs claimed Islam for
themselves and integrated their history into Islamic culture.
The
power of the Iranian cultural heritage proved strong. Throughout
subsequent centuries, a heavily Iranian-influenced Islamic civilization
spread and took root across the Asian continent into India and parts of
China. In the 11th century Mahmud of Ghazna, a recently converted Turk
from Central Asia who established Islamic rule in northern India, sought
to legitimize himself by sponsoring the composition of the great
Iranian national epic, the Book of Kings, which glorifies Iran’s
pre-Islamic Persian past. Around the same time, a Central Asian
translator might write in his preface to an important work on local
history, “Few people these days have the desire to read a book in
Arabic. Therefore, on the advice of friends, I have translated this book
into Persian.”
Continuing Legacy of Islamic Expansion
In
little more than a century, the early tensions between non-Arabs and
their Muslim counterparts helped create the international religion of
Islam. By the time the Mongols destroyed the caliphate in 1258, Islamic
literature, painting, architecture, and education had been shaped by
Iranian norms. When one considers the earlier Iranian contributions to
Islamic administration, finance, law, theology, and philosophy, it is
clear that Iranian culture played an important role in shaping the
development of Islam—a role that, as one scholar has put it, was not
less than that of Hellenistic civilization in shaping the emergence of
Christendom. During the same period the Islamic West, Syrians,
Egyptians, Berbers, Spaniards, and others also contributed to
development of Islam. And, from the 11th century on, Turks, Indians, and
other Asian peoples also brought new influences to the dynamic Islamic
civilization.
Today less than 15 percent of the world’s 1
billion Muslims are Arab, and more than twice as many Muslims live in
South Asia as in the Arab world. From Senegal to the Philippines,
converts to this world religion have infused their own native cultural
traditions into the diverse reality that is the Islamic world. Their
continuing contributions are part of a process initiated by the first
converts more than 13 centuries ago.
Richard C. Foltz
is the author of Religions of the Silk Road and several other
publications. He received his Ph.D. from Harvard University.
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